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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a restitution order in a criminal case. The defendant pleaded
guilty to disturbing the peace before the District Court on January 28, 2013. At that time, the
Court set a sentencing and restitution hearing. At the sentencing hearing on March 20, 2013, the
Court imposed sentence but at the state's request set another hearing to determine the amount of
restitution. At the restitution hearing on May 1, 2013, the Court accepted a stipulation that the
defendant would pay $400 in restitution to the Industrial Commission Crime Victims
Compensation Program. The Court then heard testimony from Ms. Kaitlin Timlin. The Court
heard argument, and ordered that the defendant pay restitution to Ms. Timlin in the amount of
$2,730 for tuition she had to pay though unable to go to school due to a head injury. The
defendant now appeals the Court's order that he pay restitution to Ms. Timlin for her tuition
expenses.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
On May 1, 2012, the state charged the defendant with aggravated battery. A preliminary

hearing was held on June 8, 2012, and the defendant's case was bound over to the District Court.
On the eve of trial, on January 28, 2013, the defendant entered a plea to Disturbing the Peace.
At that hearing, a pretrial settlement was tendered to the Court. Tr. p. 5, L. 14-15. The
pretrial settlement offer stated that the defendant agreed to pay restitution; however, amounts
written in next to the checked box were stricken through with a line making them essentially

illegible. Pretrial Settlement Offer, CRF-12-7223 (January 28, 2013) (One can make out "$400
to [illegible]/$2,729 to [illegible].").
Defense Counsel for the defendant told the Court that the defendant and the state had
agreed to a restitution hearing. Tr. p. 6, L. 22-24.

The Court asked the defendant if he

understood he was agreeing to paying restitution to be determined later and the defendant
acknowledged he had. Tr. p. 7, L. 13-17.
The Court then informed the defendant of the amended allegation.
COURT: You're charged then by way of an amended information with the misdemeanor
of disturbing the peace. Specifically, this alleges that on the 11th day of February of
2012, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, that you did willfully and maliciously
disturb the peace and/or the quiet of one Kaitlin Timlin by tumultuous conduct, offensive
conduct, threatening, or orally fighting and/or challenging the fight, such this would be a
violation of 18-6409 of the Idaho Code, that charge of disturbing the peace.
Tr. p. 12, L. 3-14. The defendant admitted guilt and the Court accepted the plea. Tr. p. 12, L. 1517.
At a sentencing and restitution hearing on March 20, 2013, the state told the Court that a
settlement may be reached as to restitution. Tr. p. 16, L. 29-16. Defense Counsel told the Court
that the defendant also wound up in the hospital as a result of the underlying incident. Tr. p. 17,
L. 11.

The state requested two years of unsupervised probation, 180 days of jail with 170

suspended with 10 to serve as five shifts on the Kootenai County Sheriffs Labor Program. Tr. p.
16.
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At the restitution hearing on May 1, 2013, the defendant and the state agreed that the
defendant would owe $400 to the Industrial Commission Crime Victims Compensation Program.
Tr. p. 21, L. 13-25. The Court then heard from Ms. Timlin. Ms. Timlin testified as to losses due
to not being able to attend college she had paid for because of a head injury she suffered. Tr. p.
23-34. Ms. Timlin explained:
KAITLIN TIMLIN: There was an altercation outside - by hitting the back of my skull so
hard that my brain bounced off the ledge on the inside.
DONNA GARDNER: Okay. If it had not been for this incident, would you have suffered
those injuries?
KAITLIN TIMLIN: No.
Tr. p. 23, L. 22-25, p. 24, L. 1-2. No further information was provided to the Court. The state
argued that "but for [the defendant's] actions that day, this victim certainly wouldn't have herself
in the predicament where she was not able to attend and complete classes that she's been
registered in." Tr. p. 34, L. 13-17. The state went on to compare the situation to one where
"somebody is injured due to a criminal act and they are unable to go to work." Tr. p. 34, L. 2224.
Defense Counsel responded that the reason the charged was reduced from aggravated
battery to disturbing the peace is that the state could not prove the defendant had caused the
injury and that in fact a great number of people were involved and might have done it. Tr. p. 35,

L. 8-25.
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The state responded that the defendant had admitted to tumultuous conduct and that Ms.
Timlin falling was caused by this conduct. Tr. p. 38, L. 1-17.
The Court found that the defendant owed Ms. Timlin' s requested amount. Tr. p. 42. The
Court's reasoning appeared to be that because a plea bargain had been made to pay restitution,
the defendant could not claim that the loss was not caused by his admitted criminal conduct. Tr.
p. 39, L. 16-21, p. 40, L. 7-21, p. 42, L. 13-19. The Court did not find that the loss was related to
the admitted criminal conduct. Tr. p. 40, L. 14-21.
The defendant timely filed a motion to appeal the Court's order for restitution.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Court err in finding the defendant had agreed to pay restitution for
uncharged conduct?
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ARGUMENT
1. Introduction
Courts are authorized by I.C. § 19-5304 to order restitution be paid by defendants in
criminal cases to their victims.

The Court must find either that the criminal conduct the

defendant admitted to is causally related to the loss suffered by the victim or that he agreed to
pay for the loss suffered. In this case, the Court erred in finding that the defendant had agreed to
pay for losses caused by Ms. Timlin's head injury and finding that thus the Court was authorized
to order restitution.
2. Standard of Review
The question whether a plea agreement is ambiguous is an issue of law, it is reviewed de
nova. State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744 (Ct.App.2002). The interpretation of ambiguous

language presents a question of fact as to the parties' intent. State v. Doe, 13 8 Idaho 409, 410-11
(Ct.App.2003).
3. The defendant did not agree to pay restitution for uncharged conduct.
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by courts in
accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73 (2005); Doe, 138 Idaho
at 410-11; Fuhriman, 137 Idaho at 744.
In the case before the Court, the defendant had agreed to pay restitution. Next to this
agreement had been written in "$400 to [illegible]/$2,729 to [illegible]." The later sum is clearly
the tuition that caused this appeal. Despite the fact that what would have been a clear indication
6

that the tuition was contemplated as part of the restitution had been stricken, the District Court
found this pretrial settlement offer sufficiently similar to the one in State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho
370 (Ct.App.2007), to find that the defendant had intended to pay restitution for uncharged
conduct. However, this is an improper application of the Court's holding in Shafer. There was
no indication as to what the restitution would be for in Shafer. Shafer dealt with the charge of
leaving the scene of an accident, a crime which relates to economic loss only in certain, extreme
cases not applicable to the case before the Court. Id. at 373. Therefore, it was clear at the outset
that the defendant in Shafer must have been promising to pay restitution for conduct unrelated to
the crime. See id. at 3 7 5.
The Court in Shafer indentified three indicators that restitution was expected for
uncharged conduct where the plea agreement was ambiguous. First, that the defendant had
agreed to pay restitution, showing that the defendant must have expected some amount to
compensate for some conduct. Id. at 374. Second, that the defendant had a lenient sentencing,
indicating that something was expected from the defendant in return. Id. at 3 75. Lastly, that at
the sentencing hearing comments by the prosecutor, defendant, and judge indicated that it was
expected that the defendant would pay restitution for property damage and medical bills caused
by the crash. Id. at 375.
In this case, the District Court failed to recognize the fact that the plea agreement showed
the parties did not agree as to the fact that the tuition was contemplated, or the fact that the state
did not argue that the loss was unrelated to the admitted criminal conduct. Thus, the pretrial
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settlement offer was not ambiguous, and so when the Court found that the conduct was not
related, that should have been the end of the matter.
Even if this Court were to find the pretrial settlement offer ambiguous, the Court failed to
properly apply the test set out by the Court in Shafer. The District Court merely found that
restitution had agreed to be paid, and found that therefore the defendant could not object to any
restitution requested on the grounds that it was unrelated to his conduct. However, that ignores
the fact that the defendant had agreed to pay restitution to the Industrial Commission Crime
Victims Compensation Program. Therefore, the mere agreement to pay restitution in the plea
bargain cannot possibly be an indication that the defendant agreed to pay compensation for
unrelated conduct.
Second, though the defendant's felony aggravated battery was reduced to a misdemeanor
disturbing the peace, defense counsel indicated that this was because of evidentiary issues with
the state's case. The state made no attempt at refuting this statement. Therefore, the Court
should not look at the bargain struck as an indication that the defendant expected to pay a large
sum in restitution. Indeed, for a misdemeanor disturbing the peace, the defendant's sentence was
actually quite harsh.
Lastly, all indications as to the defendant's understanding as to what he would pay
restitution for point away from a finding that he expected to pay for losses caused by Ms.
Timlin's head injury. The amount for tuition was written onto the pretrial settlement and
scratched out. Losses unrelated to the crime were not contemplated by either party. No request
was made for a reimbursement of hospital bills or lost wages. The crime he pied to merely

8

indicated that he had disturbed her peace, hardly a description of causing a major head injury.
The prosecution elicited testimony that the injury came from the "incident" without further
comment, but argued that tumultuous conduct had caused Ms. Timlin to fall. Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines tumultuous as "loud, excited, and emotional." Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, Tumultuous (2013) (available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/tumultuous). The District Court rejected this argument. The defendant
had agreed to pay into the victim's compensation fund, presumably to compensate for the
distress caused Ms. Timilin which he had admitted to.
Thus, the even if the plea agreement was ambiguous, the record shows that the parties
intended that the defendant agreed to compensate for Ms. Timlin' s distress, but not for other
injuries received. Had the defendant understood himself to be agreeing to such a payment, there
would have been no reason to scratch out the tuition claim in its entirety. The state argued that
the tuition flowed from the criminal conduct itself, not that it was other conduct agreed to by the
defendant. Clearly, both parties did not believe that the defendant was agreeing to pay restitution
for conduct not caused by the crime. The Court's finding that somehow both parties were
mistaken as to the defendant's intent was in error. This Court should reverse the District Court's
ruling.

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the District Court's order for restitution as to Ms. Timlin's
tuition.

The District Court's ruling fails to apply the Court of Appeal's binding precedent

correctly. It is clear from the record that the plea agreement is unambiguously not intended to
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defendant to pay for conduct not related to the admitted crime.
DATED this--~- day of August, 2013.
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